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Abstract
This note is a complementary material for the solution of optimal real-time bidding
function in paper [1], where the estimated cost is taken as the bid price, i.e., the upper
bound of the true cost. Here we discuss a more general bid optimisation framework
with various utility and cost functions.
1 Preliminaries
Define the bidding function as b(r) which returns the bid price given the estimated click-
through rate (CTR) r of an ad impression.
Winning probability. Given the market price distribution pz(z) and the bid price b, the
probability of winning the auction is
w(b) =
∫ b
0
pz(z)dz. (1)
If the bid wins the auction, the ad is displayed and the utility and cost of this ad
impression are then observed.
Utility. The utility function given the CTR is denoted as u(r). The specific form of u(r)
depends on the campaign KPI. For example, if the KPI is click number, then
uclk(r) = r. (2)
If the KPI is campaigns net profit, with the advertiser’s true value on each click is v,
then
urev(r) = vr − z. (3)
Cost. The expected cost if win given a bid b is denoted as c(b). In RTB ad market we have
first price auctions
c1(b) = b, (4)
and second price auctions
c2(b) =
∫
b
0
zpz(z)dz∫ b
0
pz(z)dz
. (5)
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In [1], we used c1(b) to model the upper bound of the second price auctions with possible
soft floor prices. Here we shall first use the abstract cost function c(b) in the framework and
then specify the implementation of the cost function in specific tasks.
2 Bid Optimisation without Budget Constraint
For non-budget bid optimisation, only urev(r) utility function is meaningful
1
Urev(b(·)) = T
∫
r
∫ b(r)
z=0
(vr − z)pz(z)dz · pr(r)dr. (6)
Take the gradient of net profit Urev(b(·)) w.r.t. the bidding function b(r) and set it to 0,
∂Urev(b(·))
∂b(·)
= (vr − b(r)) · pz(b(r)) · pr(r) = 0, (7)
which derives
b(r) = vr (8)
i.e., the optimal bid price is set as the impression value. Thus the truth-telling bidding is
the optimal strategy when there is no budget considered.
3 Bid Optimisation with Budget Constraint
Assuming we want to find the optimal bidding function b() to maximise the campaign-level
KPI r across its auctions over the lifetime with total bid requests volume T and budget B.
max
b()
T
∫
r
u(r)w(b(r))pr(r)dr (9)
subject to T
∫
r
c(b(r))w(b(r))pr(r)dr = B
The Lagrangian of the optimisation problem Eq. (9) is
L(b(r), λ) =
∫
r
u(r)w(b(r))pr(r)dr − λ
∫
r
c(b(r))w(b(r))pr(r)dr +
λB
T
, (10)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. Based on calculus of variations, the Euler-Lagrange
condition of b(r) is
L(b(r), λ)
∂b(r)
= 0, (11)
which is
u(r)pr(r)
∂w(b(r))
∂b(r)
− λpr(r)
[∂c(b(r))
∂b(r)
w(b(r)) + c(b(r))
∂w(b(r))
∂b(r)
]
= 0 (12)
⇒ λ
∂c(b(r))
∂b(r)
w(b(r)) =
[
u(r)− λc(b(r))
]∂w(b(r))
∂b(r)
. (13)
1If there is no cost-related factors in the utility, one will bid as high as possible to win every impression
as there is no budget constraint.
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Eq. (13) is a general condition of the optimal bidding function, where the specific imple-
mentations of winning function w(b), utility function u(r) and cost function c(b) are needed
to derive the corresponding form of optimal bidding function.
3.1 First-Price Auction
With cost function c1(b) in Eq. (4), Eq. (13) is written as
λ
∫ b(r)
0
pz(z)dz = (u(r)− λb(r)) · pz(b(r)) (14)
which still depends on the detailed form of market price distribution pz(z) to solve the b().
In [1], the authors tried an implementation:
pz(z) =
l
(l + z)2
, (15)
⇒ w(b) =
b
b + l
. (16)
Taking Eq. (16) and click utility Eq. (2) into Eq. (14) we have
λ
b(r)
b(r) + l
= (u(r)− λb(r)) ·
b(r)
(b(r) + l)2
(17)
⇒ b(r) =
√
u(r)l
λ
+ l2 − l, (18)
which is the result in [1].
3.2 Second-Price Auction
Taking the definition of winning function Eq. (1) and the second-price cost function Eq. (5)
into Eq. (13), we have
λ
b(r)pz(b(r))w(b(r)) − pz(b(r))
∫ b
0 zpz(z)dz
w(b(r))2
w(b(r)) = (u(r)− λc(b(r)))pz(b(r)) (19)
⇒ λ(b(r) − c(b(r))) = u(r)− λc(b(r)) (20)
⇒ b(r) =
u(r)
λ
, (21)
where we can see the optimal bidding function is linear w.r.t. CTR r.
The solution of λ is obtained by taking Eq. (21) into the constraint
T
∫
r
c(b(r))w(b(r))pr(r)dr = B, (22)
which is rewritten as ∫
r
c
(u(r)
λ
)
w
(u(r)
λ
)
pr(r)dr =
B
T
. (23)
We can see that essentially the solution of λ makes the equation between the expected
cost and the budget. Furthermore, as both w(r/λ) and c(r/λ) monotonously decrease as λ
increases, it is quite easy to find a numeric solution of λ.
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4 Discussions
The implementation of the cost constraint in Eq. (9) needs careful modelling based on the
data. In [1] the authors used the cost upper bound, i.e., the bid price, to control the cost
and let the total value of cost upper bound be the campaign budget. Here if we implement
the expected cost in second price auction Eq. (5), the cost constraint in Eq. (9) might not
be controlled by the budget. With about 50% probability, the budget will be exhausted in
advance, which is not expected in practice.
We can easily find in the first-price bidding function Eq. (18), the bid price is jointly
determined by utility function u(r), λ and market parameter l. Specifically, the bid price
is monotonic increasing w.r.t. utility while decreasing w.r.t. λ. Moreover, different value
settings for parameter l also influence the final bid decision as is shown in [1]. As is defined
in Eq. (16), we can tune the parameter l to alter the winning probability so as to fit different
market environments. In fact, we may conclude that: the market consideration influences
bid price by tuned l, the budget constraint controls bid function by λ, while advertiser’s
utility expectation u(r) could finally determine the final decision.
Let’s take a look at the bid strategy under second-price auctions. In Eq. (21), the bid
price is mainly determined by utility u(r). However, the bid strategy constructs a bridge
between utility and budget consideration by λ. And let us move our attention onto Eq. (23)
and we can find that λ is also controlled by this equation which takes both estimated CTR r
and winning probability w(·) into consideration. But the latter two factors have low effects
on bid strategy through λ.
From the discussion above, we may find that both bid strategies under either auction
setting are influenced by three factors: advertiser’s expected utility, budget constraints and
market information. While under first-price auction setting, the bid strategy takes utility
function and market price together, but the strategy upon second-price auctions reflects
utility more straightly.
For the bidding function under first-price auctions, we could take more attention on the
winning probability estimation problem and consequently to optimize the bid strategy. We
also think that it could be more crucial to take the market information into consideration
in the utility function for second-price auctions. Finally, we may take a step forward that,
to coordinates the optimization for both CTR estimation and bidding strategy, considering
market information and budget capping, to dynamically bid in real-time and real-world
environments.
References
[1] W. Zhang, S. Yuan, and J. Wang. Optimal real-time bidding for display advertising. In
Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery
and data mining, pages 1077–1086. ACM, 2014.
4
